Note: this post was heavily revised in March 2025

This topic was brought up on Facebook and X in the past, so I did a thorough write up here.

The status controversiae on this is not whether the descent merely refers to earthly burial or suffering on the cross, for this is denied, nor is it whether Christ descended according to only one nature or the other, for He descended by both, nor is it whether Christ was present in hades according to His divine nature due to immense omnipresence, for this is accepted, nor is it over whether Christ suffered in Hades, for this is denied, nor is it over whether the descent is solely part of the humiliation, for this is denied, but the controversy is over whether Christ descended 1) only in His soul, 2) by His body and soul according to the second, spiritual mode, leaving His fleshly body in the tomb, or 3) by His body and soul after revivification (usually implying the body is no longer in the tomb).

The reader must understand that this controversy came up among Lutherans because some taught a rather extreme position that Christ’s soul descended to hell and suffered there as further punishment for the sins of the world. This squarely placed the descent into hell as part of the humiliation. This was rejected, which led to the question more generally of whether the descent was part of the humiliation or exaltation (or both). The conclusion was that it was primarily part of the exaltation, with some saying it was secondarily part of the humiliation (as Bente notes was the position of Westphal, Flacius, Gallus, and Osiander), and others not mentioning it being part of the humiliation at all. Some of those who wished to place it solely in the exaltation contended that this meant Christ had revivify first before descending, for otherwise it would still be secondarily part of the humiliation.

Understand that the debated point is a non-fundamental article of faith or perhaps not an article of faith at all, but it is still worth discussing because it pushes the theologian to grasp implications of different doctrines and consider how they relate. The atheist can find much value in considering arguments for the existence of God because of the philosophical questions it brings to mind; this is much the same. Luther calls this a “useless question” but then himself discusses it only a few sentences later.

A note on interpretation: I’ve taken anyone who says that Christ was first quickened or revivified and then descended after to mean a descent of soul and body given that a revivification, followed by a descent of only the soul would be to make Christ die and subsequently revivified twice, which would be absurd. This is often the deciding factor for which position is taken by these authors, so it so not an unreasonable assumption to make about those who don’t explicit say anything.

The Formula and the Torgau Sermon

The Formula of Concord says the following:

It has also been disputed among some theologians who have subscribed to the Augsburg Confession concerning this article: When and in what manner the Lord Christ, according to our simple Christian faith, descended to hell: whether this was done before or after His death; also, whether it occurred according to the soul alone, or according to the divinity alone, or with body and soul, spiritually or bodily; also, whether this article belongs to the passion or to the glorious victory and triumph of Christ. But since this article, as also the preceding, cannot be comprehended by the senses or by our reason, but must be grasped by faith alone, it is our unanimous opinion that there should be no disputation concerning it, but that it should be believed and taught only in the simplest manner; according as Dr. Luther, of blessed memory, in his sermon at Torgau in the year 1533 has explained this article in an altogether Christian manner, separated from it all useless, unnecessary questions, and admonished all godly Christians to Christian simplicity of faith. For it is sufficient that we know that Christ descended into hell, destroyed hell for all believers, and delivered them from the power of death and of the devil, from eternal condemnation and the jaws of hell. But how this occurred we should [not curiously investigate, but] reserve until the other world, where not only this point [mystery], but also still others will be revealed, which we here simply believe, and cannot comprehend with our blind reason.

Ep IX

And since even in the ancient Christian teachers of the Church, as well as in some among our teachers, dissimilar explanations of the article concerning the descent of Christ to hell are found, we abide in like manner by the simplicity of our Christian faith [comprised in the Creed], to which Dr. Luther in his sermon, which was delivered in the castle at Torgau in the year 1533, concerning the descent of Christ to hell… and we simply believe that the entire person, God and man, after the burial descended into hell, conquered the devil, destroyed the power of hell, and took from the devil all his might. We should not, however, trouble ourselves with high and acute thoughts as to how this occurred; for with our reason and our five senses this article can be comprehended as little as the preceding one, how Christ is placed at the right hand of the almighty power and majesty of God; but we are simply to believe it and adhere to the Word [in such mysteries of faith]. Thus we retain the substance [sound doctrine] and [true] consolation that neither hell nor the devil can take captive or injure us and all who believe in Christ.

SD IX

Notably, both the Epitome and the Solid Declaration point us to the 1533 Torgau sermon. Here I quote the relevant portion from Rydecki’s translation, bold emphasis mine highlighting the relevant portions:

Thus here, when [the world] hears that Christ descended to hell, it immediately goes off and wants to speculate how it occurred, and it asks all sorts of wild and useless questions, whether only His soul descended, or whether His divinity went with it…. That is, I believe in the whole person, God and man, undivided with body and soul, born of the virgin, who suffered, died and was buried. Thus here also I should not divide anything, but should believe and say that the same Christ, God and man in one person, went to hell, but did not remain there. As Psalm 16 says of Him: “You will not abandon My soul in hell nor allow Your Holy One to see decay.” But it means “soul” according to the Scriptural use, not as we speak of it as a distinct entity from the body; it means the whole man, even as He is called “the Holy One of God.”

But how this may have happened that the man lay there in the grave and yet went to hell, that we should and must leave unfathomed and not understood. For it certainly did not happen in a bodily [leiblich] or comprehensible [greiflich] way, although one must depict it and think of it crudely and in a bodily way and thus refer to it by way of analogy, as when a mighty hero or giant enters a fortified castle with his army and his flag and his weapons and breaks it down and takes his enemy and binds him, etc. Therefore, simply say this, if someone asks you about this article: “How it took place, that I certainly don’t know, nor will I think too much about it, nor can I explain it. But I can surely paint a crude picture for you and capture it in an analogy, to speak clearly about these hidden things. Christ went and took his banner as a conquering hero and flung the door wide open with it and caused such an uproar among the devils that this one over here fell out through a window, and that one over there fell out through a hole.”

Martin Luther, Third Sermon for Easter Day, Torgau, 1533

It seems to me that the Formula specifically points to following Luther’s simplicity on the topic, avoiding speculation and useless questions, which is a repeated theme in the sermon. Most of the sermon as a whole is addressing application of the descent into hell, clearing up crude misunderstandings, and telling people not to speculate or overthink things. Very little is spoken on the controverted questions apart from saying that we don’t know. That being said, Luther makes quite a few comments in the quoted section above on the issue of the soul-body descent debate, but it remains unclear despite his comments. He says the “whole person… undivided with body and soul… suffered, died and was buried.” But he doesn’t list there the descent; what he does instead is say that in the descent “I should not divide anything” and that “God and man in one person, went to Hell.” This could suggest that Luther takes the soul and body position. What makes this difficult, however, is that the qualifier “God and man” before “in one person” could merely be a rejection of Nestorian errors, not a statement on the soul-body issue. He also qualifies afterward that Psalm 16, which mentions the descent and speaks of Christ’s soul in hell, but Luther says this doesn’t mean a distinct entity from the body but is being used as a synecdoche for the “whole man,” which suggests the soul and body position. This is made difficult by the following paragraph, however.

Luther states that “the man lay there in the grave and yet went to hell.” What’s notable here is that Luther seems to be rejecting a position held by many subsequent Lutherans that the revivification (but not the leaving of the tomb) came before the descent into hell and thus includes body and soul. This is usually based on 1 Peter 3:19 (more on this later). But what does he mean when he says that “man lay there in the grave” during the descent if both body and soul descended? He also states that the descent did not happen in a “bodily” way. This seems to point to the soul only position. This is a repeated theme too as it occurs three separate times in the sermon.

My suggestion is that Luther believes Christ’s circumscribed, local body remains in the tomb but He nonetheless descends by both body and soul, in the same way that Christ’s circumscribed, local body remains in heaven since the ascension yet He is present in the Holy Supper in both body and soul. This presence in the supper is not “bodily” but it does include the body. The distinction here is the “mode” of presence of Christ’s body. The Solid Declaration lays this out most clearly and quotes Luther for the distinction; this is not anachronism.

Also: The one body of Christ [says Luther] has a threefold mode or all three modes of being anywhere.

First, the comprehensible, bodily mode, [Erstlich die begreifliche, leibliche Weise,] [Primo, comprehensibili et corporaliratione,] as He went about bodily upon earth, when, according to His size, He vacated and occupied space [was circumscribed by a fixed place]. This mode He can still use whenever He will, as He did after the resurrection, and will use at the last day, as Paul says, 1 Tim. 6:15: “Which in His times He shall show, who is the blessed God [and only Potentate, the King of kings and Lord of lords].” And to the Colossians, 3:4: “When Christ, who is our Life, shall appear.” In this manner He is not in God or with the Father, neither in heaven, as the mad spirits dream; for God is not a bodily space or place. And this is what the passages how Christ leaves the world and goes to the Father refer to which the false spirits cite.

Secondly, the incomprehensible, spiritual [geistliche] [spirituali] mode, according to which He neither occupies nor vacates space, but penetrates all creatures wherever He pleases [according to His most free will]; as, to make an imperfect comparison, my sight penetrates and is in air, light, or water, and does not occupy or vacate space; as a sound or tone penetrates and is in air or water or board and wall, and also does not occupy or vacate space; likewise, as light and heat penetrate and are in air, water, glass, crystal, and the like, and also do not vacate or occupy space; and much more of the like [many comparisons of this matter could be adduced]. This mode He used when He rose from the closed [and sealed] sepulcher, and passed through the closed door [to His disciples], and in the bread and wine in the Holy Supper, and, as it is believed, when He was born of His mother [the most holy Virgin Mary].

Thirdly, the divine, heavenly mode, since He is one person with God, according to which, of course, all creatures must be far more penetrable and present to Him than they are according to the second mode. For if, according to that second mode, He can be in and with creatures in such a manner that they do not feel, touch, circumscribe, or comprehend Him, how much more wonderfully will He be in all creatures according to this sublime third mode, so that they do not circumscribe nor comprehend Him, but rather that He has them present before Himself, circumscribes and comprehends them! For you must place this being of Christ, who is one person with God [for you must place this mode of presence of Christ which He has by His personal union with God], very far, far outside of the creatures, as far as God is outside of them; and again as deep and near within all creatures as God is within them. For He is one inseparable person with God; where God is, there must He also be, or our faith is false.

SD VII 98-102

Note the “comprehensible, bodily mode” in the opening. This is the same language used by Luther in the Torgau sermon, namely “leiblich” and “greiflich” in the German. In my reading of Luther, Christ did not descend according to this mode (mode 1: local, circumscribed presence). But this does not at all rule out the second mode, which I believe is what Luther is saying. Christ descended in body and soul according to the second mode, not the first, and His fleshly body lay in the tomb still (something seemingly rejected by many later Lutherans, such as Hollaz who states Christ’s body “was not lying in the tomb.”)

Surveying the authors after Luther

The following early Lutherans say nothing (that I could find) of the discussion of Christ’s soul/body and speak only about the person or natures of Christ: Nicolaus Hunnius, Hutter, Hamilton, Sarcerius, Melanchthon, and Bugenhagen.

Schmid (who summarizes the opinions of the scholastics) says nothing on the topic.

Rhegius affirm that the soul descends and says we do not know about the body and shouldn’t speculate.

Among the pre-pietist Lutherans, John Parsimonius, John Matsperger, Brenz, the preachers at Augsburg in 1565 (see Bente’s Historical Introduction to the Lutheran Confessions on these figures), Quenstedt, Calov, Baier, Nakskow, and Hollaz say that both body and soul descended, with most clearly stating that this took place after the revivification.

Chemnitz gives mixed signals. He isn’t explicit anywhere I could find. In his Two Natures, he cites Cyril affirmatively saying, “The soul having been assigned a union with the Logos descended into hell, using its divine power and efficacy…” and “The deity [alone] did not descend into hell, but the soul having shared in the union with the Logos descended and used its divine power and efficacy to appear to the spirits who were there.” And Epiphanius affirmatively saying, “Having descended in the deity to hell with His soul and having redeemed the prisoners with fortitude and power, the divine Logos returned with His holy soul, with which He had freed the captives and on the third day He rose with body and soul from the dead.” But he also quotes Augustine affirmatively saying, “I know that the deity descended into hell with the attribute of the flesh. I know that the flesh ascended into heaven by the power of the deity. As it was not a property of the flesh to walk with dry feet above the threatening waves…” So Chemnitz could go either way, but the quotes are 3:1 in favor of only the soul descending.

Gerhard says nothing in particular but affirmatively quotes Cyril saying, “The soul that was given union with the Word descended into hell and by divine power said to those in chains: ‘Come forth!’” This seems to place him in the “soul only” camp.

Of the pietists (1700s), Pontoppidan says nothing of the soul/body at all (expected, as he wrote a catechism for children, not a dogmatics text). Knapp, who wrote dogmatics lectures, affirms that only the soul descended and not the body.

Of the post-pietists (1800-present):

The following affirm that only the soul descended and not the body: Weidner, Sartorius, Martensen, Kildahl, and Remensnyder.

Kahnis says Christ descended “as a sprit after death, before the resurrection” but it’s unclear what this means.

Stump only mentions that He descended prior to his revivification but doesn’t elaborate. This likely places him either in the soul only or second mode position.

Elert and Engelbrecht do not specify anything about body and soul.

The following affirm descent of the body and soul: Engelder, Arndt, Graebner, & Mayer (in The Doctrines of the Churches of Christendom, which they collectively coauthored), Golladay, Lenski, Kretzmann, Lenker, Lindberg, Jacobs, Lange, Schaller, Voigt, John Theodore Mueller, Steven Mueller, Nafzger, Walther, Pieper, Scharlemann, Scaer, Bente, and Koehler, with most taking the position that Christ descended after the revivification (Lindberg is a clear exception to this).

My opinion

My personal take is that any position is acceptable, but I believe that Christ’s body remained in the tomb during the descent, but He nonetheless descended to hell with His body according to the second mode, as He is present in the Holy Supper. This position seems to be that of Lindberg who writes “Through His divine power and in a divine way He betook Himself with His pneumatic body to Hades. His descent was verus et realis, but did not take place in a local way, humanly speaking, but supernaturalis.” I believe this makes the most sense of the relevant passages as I will show very briefly.

1 Peter 3:18-19: “For Christ also suffered once for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh [Gk: σαρκὶ, Vul: carne, Lut: Fleisch] but made alive by the Spirit [Vul: spiritu, Lut: Geist], by whom also He went and preached to the spirits in prison,”

This is the sedes doctrinae of this doctrine. Proponents of the view that Christ descended after his vivification take the final clause “by whom also He went and preached to the spirits in prison” coming after “made alive by the Spirit” to mean that Christ descended after he was revivified. I don’t believe this follows for two reasons: 1) The clause begins with “by whom also” (Gk: ἐν ᾧ καὶ). This phrase is placed here because it follows the word “Spirit,” not due to temporal order. Christ was put to death in the flesh but made alive by the Spirit. This same Spirit is also the one by Whom He preached to the spirits in prison. Take this example: Say I crashed my car and had it towed to the mechanic. Then I said this: “I rode my bike to the car mechanic but came home in my car, in which also I crashed.” Did I crash the car after I took it to the mechanic or before? In isolation the statement is ambiguous, but because I told you that I crashed it before, you know it came before I took it to the mechanic, and this is not problematic with the clause being at the end of the sentence. 2) The Apostles’ Creed does seem to be laying out temporal order: “conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried; He descended into hell; the third day He rose again from the dead; He ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead.” Notice that every event there is chronological. If we take the descent into hell to be after the revivification, it seems it would make most sense to have it after rising from the dead. The only alternative reading is that “rose again from the dead” refers to leaving the tomb and appearing to others rather than revivification, but this seems less plausible as revivification is the more important redemptive aspect than leaving the tomb/appearing and is the plain meaning of “rose again from the dead.” I note the Latin and German here for “Spirit” because I wish to show the connection between the passage and how the Formula refers to the second mode. Christ descends by the Spirit (spiritu, Geist), and the second mode is spiritual (geistliche, spirituali).

Psalm 16:9-10: “Therefore my heart is glad, and my glory rejoices; My flesh [MT: bāśār, LXX: σάρξ, Vul: caro, Lut: Fleisch] also will rest in hope. For You will not leave my soul in Sheol, Nor will You allow Your Holy One to see corruption.”

Acts 2:22-31: “Men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a Man attested by God to you by miracles, wonders, and signs which God did through Him in your midst, as you yourselves also know— Him, being delivered by the determined purpose and foreknowledge of God, you have taken by lawless hands, have crucified, and put to death; whom God raised up, having loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible that He should be held by it. For David says concerning Him:

‘I foresaw the Lord always before my face,
For He is at my right hand, that I may not be shaken.
Therefore my heart rejoiced, and my tongue was glad;
Moreover my flesh [Gk: σάρξ, Vul: caro, Lut: Fleisch] also will rest in hope.
For You will not leave my soul in Hades,
Nor will You allow Your Holy One to see corruption.
You have made known to me the ways of life;
You will make me full of joy in Your presence.’

Men and brethren, let me speak freely to you of the patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his tomb is with us to this day. Therefore, being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him that of the fruit of his body, according to the flesh, He would raise up the Christ to sit on his throne, he, foreseeing this, spoke concerning the resurrection of the Christ, that His soul was not left in Hades, nor did His flesh [Gk: σάρξ, Vul: caro, Lut: Fleisch] see corruption.”

This is the passage cited by Luther earlier in the Torgau sermon. Several difficulties arise with the reading that Christ descended with His body after the revivification. The flesh “rests,” and this seems to me connected with the following verses about the soul being in Hades and the Holy One not seeing corruption. “Rests” suggests it is not moving (such as descending to hell); meanwhile the soul is in hell. Thus, the revivification cannot yet have taken place. Next, “corruption” undoubtedly refers to the flesh decomposing. If the revivification had already taken place when the soul is in hell, then why mention flesh not decomposing? The flesh will only decompose if it is not vivified. It is also worth noting that Peter takes “Your Holy One” to be Christ but he specifically ties it to His flesh. This seems to be in contrast to “soul” mentioned immediately before. If you insert “flesh” into the Psalm (as Peter does after the quote), it becomes apparent what’s going on: The flesh rests. The soul is in Hades (but will come out later). Yet the flesh miraculously does not decompose in the meantime. This precludes the view that Christ is revivified prior to His descent. I contend that “flesh” is distinct from “body” here in that “flesh” refers more particularly to the body in local presence (mode 1) but leaves room for the body in mode 2. For this reason, I have provided the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and German to demonstrate the consistencies of taking this as “flesh” and not generically “body.” The two alternative views, soul only or descent with body according to the second mode, both avoid these problems.

Ephesians 4:8-10: “Wherefore he saith, When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men. (Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things.)”

The previous three passages could be read both in favor of the soul only position and the second mode position. I contend that this passage rules out the soul only position. Lutherans have consistently taken the last part of this quote that Christ fills all things to be speaking not merely about divine omnipresence but about Him filling all things with His body. Christ ascends above all heavens and this certainly entails filling the heavens, but He also descends, entailing that he fills hell too. But if he fills the heavens with His body by ascending in His body, it seems He would also fill hell with His body by descending in His body. He would not fill heaven without ascending to heaven in His body, so neither would He fill hell without descending to hell in His body. An objector might say that because he ascended according to Mode 1, He also must have descended then according to Mode 1. I reject this on the grounds that the ascension is a more full and glorious act of His exaltation, whereas the descent is primarily an act of His exaltation but secondarily an act of His humiliation. Consider what Martensen writes on the descent as exaltation and humiliation:

We have included the descent into Hades in the doctrine of Christ’s exaltation. Yet viewing it in another aspect, it may certainly be taken as part of His humiliation. We must take it as belonging to His humiliation when we look upon Christ as now fully submitting himself to the law of death, undergoing the common fate of man, by descending into the valley of the shadow of death; because the spirit is then separated from its corporeity, and lives in an uncompleted being, waiting for its re-union with the body. So far therefore as Christ’s humiliation and exaltation are viewed as successive states, the descent into Hades may be described as the connecting link, and is at once the lowest step of His humiliation and the beginning of His exaltation.

Hans Martensen, Christian Dogmatics

Martensen appears to be viewing this event in part through the lens of recapitulation theory, and in that lens (rather than a Penal Substitution lens), the humiliation aspect becomes apparent. Christ as man goes to Hades in order to redeem Hades for men, but men going to Hades surely is not an exaltation of them but a humiliation, so it is a humiliation for Christ too. Of course, for Christ it is also (and primarily) an exaltation because of His purpose for being there and His actions while there (declaring victory). I might add that the descent is also trivially part of the humiliation in that Christ “moves down.” One can say similar things about the crucifixion too. Christ is, in some sense, exalted in the crucifixion because He is literally lifted up, and He, in death, defeats sin, which is surely exalting. Revivification, appearing to men resurrected, and ascending into heaven are all squarely part of the exaltation and not the humiliation.

Conclusion

It is important to not let the fine matters of the discussion get overemphasized here. I see this topic as more of a grounds for discussing theology more broadly, not as a point of contention. The Formula rightly sets the stage by pointing us to the important things to affirm on this article, avoiding heated discussion over finer points (including this debate specifically) and avoiding speculation. Nonetheless, I do think my conclusion is accurate, even if it is unimportant more generally.

A frequent argument in traditional Christian circles is the dispute over the cause of modernism. The standard approach from Roman Catholic and Eastern Christians is to say that the Reformation was the cause of modernism. In this context, this is a condemning argument for Protestantism. For the traditionalist, modernism is a root of many evils, so if Protestantism caused modernism, then Protestantism certainly cannot be the true faith, since the true faith wouldn’t have such disastrous results. Sometimes, Protestantism is even used synonymously with modernism and anti-traditionalism. Two examples of this from traditionalist circles recently are Last Things’ video essay on Secondary and Secondary Secondary Worlds and Ed Dutton’s video on The Priestly Cycle of Universities. In the former, Last Things constructs an argument on aesthetics in media and calls the uglier and plainer styles “Protestant,” while the grand and baroque styles are called “Catholic.” In the latter, Dutton attributes a supposed intellectual decline in the 16th century to the Protestants, particularly those in England, saying that the geniuses were doing work in medieval scholastic thought, all of whom, according to him, were Catholic, while the anti-scholastic party was filled with Protestants.

The irony in these videos is rather apparent to anyone familiar with the time period. Last Things at one point cites Albrecht Dürer as an example of the supposedly grand “Catholic” style, but Dürer was himself in the Protestant camp and is commemorated on the LCMS church calendar. And Dutton uses Isaac Newton as an example of a genius who had to work carefully so as not to incriminate himself. In this case, Newton may actually help his argument, but not how he thinks. Newton was a Protestant, which may at first seem to hurt Dutton’s argument that the Catholics were the geniuses, and Newton was extremely anti-scholastic, being an enlightenment figure, which also might seem to hurt Dutton’s argument that the scholastics were the geniuses. My contention, however, is that Newton was a primary proponent of philosophy that was starkly modern and anti-traditional, so having him be a Protestant is, if anything, harmful to my argument. My reason for pointing this out, however, is that these figures don’t know their way around the subject at all. They use examples that run straight against their argument, or in other cases, make points that don’t help their narrative in the way they’re framing it.

I should clarify for the reader that, if these content creators mean by “Protestant” the Anabaptists, Quakers, and movements that came out of the Great Awakenings, then I might agree, at least in part; I do think those movements assisted in creating what we call modernism. But the overall trend in these circles is often to blame these problems on Luther himself or all Protestants as a whole, including the more high-church traditions of Lutheranism and Anglicanism. Considering that Quakers are a small group (isolated mostly to the Anglo-sphere) and that most people don’t know a single Quaker (there are only ~400,000 in the world), considering that most Anabaptists people know are primitivists (Amish, Mennonite, etc.) and that Anabaptists were probably the least societally influential group in the Reformation, and considering that the great awakenings came in the mid-1700s, long after the Reformation and the introduction of modernism, the proponent of the thesis that the Reformation caused modernism must rest his case on proving that Lutherans, Anglicans, and the Reformed were the primary cause of modernism.

The fundamental problem with the claim

If it were indeed true that early magisterial Protestants were opponents of baroque styles, tradition, or scholasticism, then my opponents would have a strong case. But it doesn’t take being an expert in history to examine these claims and find their falsehood. Many of the most influential theologians of the Reformation were scholastics. Melanchthon’s, Chemnitz’s, and Gerhard’s Loci were all undoubtedly scholastic. Even Luther, who is famous for bashing the scholastics, will still compliment them and use the scholastic method to his advantage, even employing apparent philosophical arguments in his disputations (for examples, see many in LW 73 or Apology II.28). That these figures used tradition only takes reading their standard works. One can only read a few pages of any of these figures without being bombarded with quotes from church fathers or engaging with medieval figures like Anselm or Bernard. It was Gerhard himself who coined the term “Patrologia” (patrology: study of the fathers) in his book of the same name. With regard to baroque styles, need anything be said past googling “Lutheran cathedral” or “Anglican cathedral” and seeing examples of their architecture, which, if not always baroque, is always in traditional, elegant styles, whether that be gothic, neo-gothic, or baroque. As for the music, Telemann, Pachelbel, Praetorius, Schütz, Buxtehude, Bach, and Handel were all Lutheran, and Gibbons and Purcell were Anglicans. The baroque era was dominated by Protestants, not Catholics.

It is true that the Reformed tradition (Anglicans excepted) were pushing for more plain styles and moved away (to a degree) from more traditional aspects of Christianity, but to claim that they were not scholastic would be entirely false. The Reformed tradition was perhaps the most scholastic of all the traditions in the post-Reformation era. From a Lutheran perspective, we’d contend that their use of scholastic philosophy was perhaps overbearing on their theology, a detriment to it even. If there is any kernel of truth to the argument that the Reformation caused modernism, it would be that political theorists from the Reformed camp did tend toward more modernist theories, and the plain architecture and iconoclasm of the Reformed tradition pushed it away from traditional styles. I will concede that much to the proponents of the thesis. I will also concede that Bacon was a very influential modernist thinker and was Anglican, but past these concessions, I do not believe the thesis that Protestantism caused modernism holds any water.

Roman Catholic philosophers in this time, on the other hand, were proponents of modernism. Étienne de La Boétie, Montaigne, Charron, Mersenne, Descartes, Malebranche, and Beccaria were all Roman Catholic and are all staple names of modern philosophy, many pushing skepticism quite strongly. The Jesuit order in general pushed for modern philosophy, including skepticism and nominalism (or conceptualism). Frequently, skeptical arguments were specifically promoted in order to combat Protestant arguments. Perhaps the strongest scholastic figure of the post-Reformation era was Francisco Suarez, who was a Jesuit conceptualist; that is to say, he was not a staunch traditionalist following the Dominican Thomists or Franciscan Scotists. By contrast, nearly all major Protestant theologians were scholastic realists or Neoplatonists, following the traditions of Aquinas, Scotus, Bonaventure, Hugo, Anselm, Bernard, Tauler, etc., and virtually all of them had a strong devotion to St. Augustine in particular, who was a Neoplatonist himself.

The real beginning of modernism

The roots of modernism can be traced to nominalism and humanism, but I’d also contend that these are not necessarily the foundation of modernism’s problems. Nominalism/conceptualism was popularized in the late medieval period by Ockham, who died in 1347. While I think there are serious problems with this position, attributing modernism to Ockham is anachronistic. If Ockham caused modernism, then why did it take 200 years to have any effects? I believe nominalism to be something of a necessary condition for modernism, but the fact that modernism didn’t come into popular thought until ~200 years later is a pretty fatal blow to those that want to attribute modernism to Ockham. I believe the same argument can be made for humanism, given that the father of humanism, Petrarch, lived from 1304-1374.

I’d like to propose that the real beginning of modernism precedes the Reformation in particular in the thought of Niccolo Machiavelli, who in turn influenced Étienne de La Boétie, Montaigne, and Sanches (who was Jewish), the leading voices of Pyrrhonism, the school of radical skepticism, which led to the foundationalist response of Descartes and the empiricist response of Hobbes (who had controversial religious views). Machiavelli was a highly original thinker. This is not to say he had no influences– he had plenty; he was highly eclectic. It’s this very eclecticism that makes him original, however. He does not clearly subscribe to particular prior systems, instead crafting new thoughts, though he was certainly a product of humanism and nominalism and not scholastic realism. He was a critic of established structures, both ecclesiastical and political, and he was even an atheist and materialist. Attributing to him the title of the founder of modern thought is not unique to me. A read through his Wikipedia article shows that numerous other scholars have said the same.

Following Machiavelli, Étienne de La Boétie’s Discourse on Voluntary Servitude is a staple work in the beginning of modern political thought, linking together the obedience of men to tyrannical despots. This line of thought would later be picked up by anarchists and revolutionaries. Montaigne was friends with La Boétie and was influenced by his new, modern political thought. Montaigne further took philosophy in the Pyrrhonist skeptic direction, which soon thereafter spread quickly across Europe, being picked up in particular by Sanches. This skepticism left a philosophical vacuum. The strong skepticism of Pyhrronism leaves much to be desired as it denies that we may have any certainty about anything. It is this vacuum that leads to Descartes and Hobbes, who are often considered the primary figures of the early enlightenment on the continent and the isles respectively. Instead of turning to older arguments refuting skepticism, however, they instead form new theories, thus marking the foundations of modern philosophy, which is the desired destination of this blog post.

I believe this account of modernism is much more coherent than the account that tries to make the Reformation the cause of modernism, and I hope this post at least gives a starting point for those who are interested in this topic. I’d quite like the idea that Protestantism caused every modern problem to go away as I don’t believe it’s an accurate account of history or a helpful idea to push. If we wish to contend that Anabaptists, Reformed political theory and art, and Quakers were all part of modernism, then I will gladly concede those points; I do not enjoy any of those things; I will gladly fight against them; and I will attribute contemporary problems to those parts of Protestantism; Lutherans have consistently condemned such things, and the Reformed, Anabaptists, and Quakers are no more our allies than Rome. I’d “rather drink pure blood with the Pope than mere wine with the fanatics,” as Luther said. I rest my case.

Further reading

https://chinglican.synology.me/2016/10/30/how-the-17th-c-french-catholic-use-of-pyrrhonian-scepticism-against-calvinism-created-the-french-enlightenment-skeptics/

I had a friend recently ask me “Does anyone know any good medieval works in English? In terms of topics, just anything that would be influential that my Lutheran seminary deems unimportant behind Luther.” Finally, someone was speaking my language.

When the medieval period begins and ends is debated. The general principle is that it is the period between the fall of Rome and the renaissance. This provides some difficulties. Rome does not fall all at once. Furthermore, many Roman institutions remained even after all would consider Rome to be entirely fallen. And the question arises, “Do the middle ages include the fall of Rome itself?” The end of the period provides similar difficulties. The renaissance does not occur at once in all places, and nailing down when the renaissance even begins for a given location is not easy either. A return to the classics is seen as the staple of the renaissance, but what does that entail? Is the revival of Aristotle a return to the classics? Most would say this does not count, but it’s not clear why this is the case, especially given the Italian proto-Renaissance occurring concurrently beginning in 1260. And even after the renaissance has begun, the middle ages don’t cease to be necessarily. The institutions from the middle ages all remain; the shift was cultural, and even then, much of medieval culture and scholarship remained even into the early 1700s. Traces remain even in the mid-1700s, such as Bernardinus De Moor’s Didactico-Elenctic Theology (1778!) and vestiges of renaissance-style music persisting until 1770 in Rococo and 1780 in Galant and Empfindsamkeit styles, which is decidedly after the renaissance ends. And if we’re measuring cultural changes, then the baroque period must follow the renaissance, though the baroque period begins in the early 1600s and ends in the mid-1700s, which is the same time that the last traces of what we think of as the middle ages disappear. For a look at some of the philosophical history on this subject, I recommend this episode of History of Philosophy without any gaps. A sort of extended long middle ages might be said to last from 476 to 1780, whereas a sort of truncated short middle ages might be said to last from 636-1260, with the standard view in the middle being roughly from 500-1500.

Moving away from the question of when the middle ages begins and to the question at hand, the seminary at Ft Wayne doesn’t seem to cover much of the period between Augustine and Luther, apart from the theology of the Councils of Ephesus (431 AD) and Chalcedon (451 AD), which establish orthodox Christology on the one person and two natures of Christ. The period between Augustine (354-430 AD) and the advent of Scholasticism (which begins with Anselm (1033-1109 AD)) is sometimes called “the period of Augustinian synthesis.” The reason it has sometimes been given this name is that, in the West, Augustine was so influential that his theology became normative for the church, and a great deal of ink was spilt trying to understand all that Augustine wrote. Notable figures including Prosper of Aquitaine, Fulgentius of Ruspe, Caesarius of Arles, Boethius, Lupus Servatus, Bede, and the councils of Arles and Orange are especially influenced by Augustine. In the complete collection of the Latin church fathers by Migne, Augustine takes up volumes 32-47; that makes 16 of 221 volumes that span 1000 years of Latin theology. Only a select few authors have 4 or more volumes in the collection. Augustine was exceedingly prolific. He was well-versed in the classical literature of the pagans, an excellent writer, and familiar with the Latin theology that preceded him. This makes his thought decidedly classical, rather than medieval, though he lived during the fall of Rome. If the reader wants a good taste of this, Augustine’s City of God is an excellent demonstration of his knowledge of the pagans and his perspective on Rome as the empire slowly collapsed around him.

But even after Augustine, the classical world did not simply end, as I previously mentioned. Rome was not fully fallen until 493 AD when Odoacer, the German, took sole control of (western) Rome, and as late as the 7th century, there were still pockets of the classical world. The church father Isidore of Seville (560-636 AD) is often considered the last scholar of the classical world. Notable figures such as Boethius (480-524 AD) and Pope Gregory the Great (540-604 AD) both precede Isidore, and Boethius in particular is decidedly classical in thought, drawing on classical sources frequently and translating Greek to Latin. After Isidore, however, classical Greek and the classical Greek corpus were largely lost in the West (with a few notable exceptional scholars) until the time of the Renaissance, and this period decidedly marks medieval thought.

Categorizing the middle ages

Using broad strokes, the early middle ages are characterized by the collapse of the remains of Rome, the dark ages*, and the Carolingian and later Ottonian renaissances.

The high middle ages are marked primarily by 12th century renaissance, scholasticism, and the revival of Aristotle through translations from Arabic into Latin.

The late middle ages stand out as somewhat transitional, with the Italian renaissance, humanism, nominalism, and the proto-reformations.

*A note on the period known as the “dark ages.” This period follows the fall of Rome. It is not that there was no innovation in this time or that all was in chaos and shambles, but due to the loss of institutional connections to the eastern Roman empire (Byzantia), Greek was lost as a language along with the classical texts. Many institutions from Rome had also fallen, hindering education. The dark ages, properly speaking, only last for a short period, however. The time between Isidore and the Carolingian Renaissance is only 153 years (636-789 AD). Charlemagne revived education, and notable scholars such as Alcuin of York (735-804 AD) came about. With the revival of education, new texts and scholarship continued, including the development of theology.

Answering the original question…

Between Augustine and Luther is a little over 1,000 years. I’ve left out figures that are often considered unorthodox (such as John Scotus Eriugena, Peter Abelard, and Ockham) and figures that I do not believe will be beneficial to readers looking to develop their theology as Lutherans specifically. While Biel, for example, may be very important, his theology is so set against Lutheranism that I cannot recommend he be read in a broad theological survey. I’ve also left out Eastern figures, but for our purposes, I’d keep the list short with the extracts of the acts and canons of Constantinople II and III, John Cassian, Cyril of Alexandria, the church histories of Socrates and Sozomen, pseudo-Dionysius, Maximos the Confessor, and John of Damascus.

Here are my recommendations on who to read for theology between Augustine and Luther (works in bold are most significant):

The major (orthodox western) theologians of the early middle ages (whether they be truly medieval or not) are Vincent of Lerins, Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, Alcuin, Bede, Boethius, and Isidore.

• Vincent is famous for his Commonitorium in which he discusses tradition and the faith.
• Leo’s best known for his Synodal Tome for the Council of Chalcedon. Definitely worth a read. Not long.
• Gregory is best known for his sermons and liturgical reforms, so any sermon selection would be good, but his work on Job is among the longest of all Patristic texts and is considered excellent.
• Alcuin is great, but not necessary in my opinion.
• Bede’s most famous work is the History of the English Church.
• Boethius’ best work is his Consolation of Philosophy, but his Theological Tractates are excellent and are a great short read (they total under 50 pages).
• Isidore is best known for his Etymologies, which isn’t necessarily a book you want to read straight through but rather a reference tool. It’s pretty much the first encyclopedia.

In the high middle ages, the best stuff is probably Peter Damian, Anselm, the Victorines, Bernard, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, and Dante.

• Peter Damian’s best work is On Divine Omnipotence, which tries to resolve whether God can do paradoxes pretty much.
• Anselm’s best work is debatable, but Monologion, Proslogion, and Why God Became Man are the three best. These are philosophical theology and begin the era of scholasticism.
• The Victorines are among the best representatives of developed Augustinian theology. The two best works here IMO are Richard of St Victor on the Trinity and Hugh of St Victor’s Didascalion.
• Bernard’s best are his Sermons on the Song of Songs and On Loving God.
• Peter Lombard’s iconic work is his Sentences, which is the main medieval theology textbook into Luther’s day. It’s a systematic theology.
• Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus are where things start getting pretty darn technical.
  • If you don’t want to get into more difficult material, I say go for Bonaventure’s Breviloquium or Aquinas’ Compend of Theology, which are their short systematic theologies, or Bonaventure’s Soul’s Journey into God, which is an extended meditation.
  • If you want deeper stuff, Bonaventure’s commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, Summa Contra Gentiles, and Disputed Questions on Truth, and Scotus’ Ordinatio.
• Dante: Divine Comedy. This is a forerunner work to the coming renaissance.

In the late middle ages (the shortest period), the best work is found in the German mystics (especially Eckhart, Tauler, Suso, and Ruysbroeck), Wycliffe, Hus, and other proto-Protestants.

• Germany mystical works: Theologia Germanica (Luther’s favorite work after Augustine and the Bible) and selections from Meister Eckhart’s sermons, which contain the pure gospel in a time of increasing neo-pelagianism
• Wycliffe: Trialogus. This is a broad theological work.
• Hus: On the Church (Luther draws on this heavily) and the Four Articles of Prague.
• If one wants more on proto-Protestants, check out Reformers before the Reformation: principally in Germany and the Netherlands by Ullmann (Vol I, Vol II). It’s dated but has lots of good material in it.

Some material from our dogmaticians:

Chemnitz

Chemnitz, discussing late fathers of the church in his Loci Theologici volume 1 discusses Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory the Great, and pseudo-Dionysius.

Gerhard

The fathers can also be divided into centuries or generations…

in the fifth century, Optatus of Milevis, Ephraem, Evagrius, Augustine, Prudentius, Gennadius, Hesychius, Maximus of Turin, Orosius, Cassian, Cyril of Alexandria, Vincent of Lérins, Synesius, Claudius Marius Victorius, Eucherius, Isidore of Pelusium, Leo I, Primasius, Theodoret, Prosper, Theodulus, Sedulius, Vigilius, Gelasius, Salvianus, Fulgentius, Junilius, Salonius, Paulinus;

in the sixth century, Boethius, Maxentius, Eusebius of Emesa, Cassiodorus, Aretas, Gregory of Tours, Alcimus [Ecdicius Avitus], Fortunatus, Olympiodorus, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Spain [Seville];

in the seventh century, Anastasius, Sophronius, Caesarius, Andodenus;

in the eighth century, Bede the Presbyter, Alcuin, Damascenus, Charlemagne, Paul the Deacon;

in the ninth century, Haymo, Photius, Bertramus, Rabanus, Walafrid Strabo, the author of the Glossa ordinaria, Paschasius, Remigius, Angelomus, Hincmar, Ulrich of Augsburg;

in the tenth century, Oecumenius, Fulbert of Chartres, Theophylact, Humbert, Algerus, Euthymius, Guitmundus, Hildebert, Giselbert, Luitprandus, Ansbertus, Radulpus, Smaragdus;

in the eleventh century, Rupert of Deutz, Anselm, Florentinus Wigorniensis, Lanfranc, Peter Damian, Rerno;

in the twelfth century, Bernard, Honorius of Autun, Nilus the archbishop of Thessalonica, Hugh of St. Victor, Theodore Balsamon the patriarch of Antioch, etc.

Johann Gerhard, Loci Theologici, Method of Theological Study, section 5, chapter 3, point 3

Weidner

Weidner lists the following theologians from this era in his An Introduction to Dogmatic Theology:

• In the oriental church, Cyril of Alexandria and John of Damascus.
• In the western church, Vincent of Lerins, Gennadius of Marsailles, Isidore of Seville, John Scotus Eriugena, and Boethius.
• In the middle ages (as he calls it),
  • In the beginning of scholasticism, Anselm, Roscellinus, William of Champeaux, Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St Victor, Richard of St Victor, Walter of St Victor, and Peter Lombard.
  • In the highest bloom of scholasticism, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon.
  • In the decline of scholasticism, Durand of St Poursain, William Ockham, Peter D’Ailly, John Gerson, and Gabriel Biel.
  • In mystical and pre-Reformation theology, Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, Heinrich Suso, John Ruysbroeck, the author of the Theologia Germanica, John Wycliffe, John Huss, Johann Wessel, and Johann von Wessel.

Further Reading

Early church fathers every theologian should read

A list of orthodox Lutheran theologians worth your time

The title says it all. I read all of Plato, including his apocryphal works, and the relevant works by Xenophon and Aristophanes in 7 months. That’s 51 books in all– some very short, some very long. Here are my reflections…

Why?

I’m something of a “completionist” at heart. I like to start at the beginning of things at the very basic level and work my way through every detail of something. Sometimes this means I don’t finish or get burnt out. I’ve played through the first 2 temples of Legend of Zelda: Majora’s Mask multiple times, getting all of the possible items and heart pieces along the way, but I’ve never actually beaten the game. This time, however, I did complete my task, at least in some manner. My real end goal is reading the high and late medieval Neo-Platonists, specifically with an understanding of those who preceded them (again, completionist mindset), so the beginning of this journey was reading the Socratic corpus (I already read the extant Pre-Socratic corpus a couple years ago). Neo-Platonism has had a great impact on Christian thought, so I thought it would be beneficial to know, especially considering the high praise Luther gives these works, in particular St. Augustine, St. Bernard, the Theologia Germanica, and the Friends of God. I also thought it would be good material to know in general. For centuries, these works were standard in education; it seemed to me that not knowing them was a disadvantage I had compared to former generations. Why should I be undereducated?

How?

Audiobook. Librivox had nearly all of the works available on audiobook (free as always). Two were available on YouTube. Epigrams and Halcyon were not available, so I made audio recordings myself (available on the Audiobooks page). Xenophon’s Symposium and Oeconomicus were not available either, so I simply read. I didn’t record these. They were rather long by comparison to Epigrams and Halcyon, which are both very short.

I came up with a loosely chronological order, based on some research (the chronology is actually highly debated), and just worked my way through. I listened on runs, on walks, lifting weights, in the car, etc. In retrospective, the order in which I read them could have been much better. I should have followed the traditional tetralogies of Thrasyllus, with the relevant apocryphal and non-Platonic material thrown in between the tetralogies. This keeps them organized by topic, which helps in understanding the material.

Reflections

Here’s a table of the works, organized by tetralogy, along with the apocryphal material. I’ve also given each tetralogy a description. The works in the tetralogies don’t always fit their theme perfectly. These are loose connections between the works. Plato is no systematician, and if you look at the 9 themes, you’ll see that they don’t seem to have a particularly coherent organizing principle. Perhaps this is my own fault for how I’ve decided the tetralogies hold together, but I haven’t found better connecting principles than these.

I thought perhaps I’d offer some reflections on every work, but I don’t think this is worth the time to read in all honesty. In part, this is because I listened to these works rather than sitting down and reading. Sometimes, I didn’t have the best focus while listening, so I’d miss details. It’s hard to count reps lifting weights while trying to focus on the arguments in the Parmenides or the wild physics of the Timaeus (and counting the reps is more important, so that took mental priority). But I also don’t think I have much to offer in terms of novel value. If you want brief summaries, go to Wikipedia or Google.

Here’s my review of the corpus:

Plato offers some very interesting ideas. Some of his political philosophy rightly addresses fundamental issues of political theory (his critiques of the masses are ever-relevant in democratic societies, for example). His metaphysical ideas are foundational to later authors, even if he fails to solve of the pressing objections to his theories. Much of his science is simply false; this is especially apparent in the Timaeus. His practical wisdom is generally quite good, but it’s also often just obvious. He will frequently repeat that an experienced lawyer, for example, is better at doing law than someone who has no experience in law. This should be obvious, but he repeats this point many times.

That being said, I’d say the majority of Plato is not all that helpful. This may strike some readers. I think this is because he has such a high reputation. His reputation, however, comes from his famous and important works, such as the Republic. Most people do not read all the minor and apocryphal works, which are far humbler in terms of meaty content. The Laws in particular, his longest work, is an absolute drag. It is dry and tedious, and much of it is simply about details of exactly what legislation he would have if he were running the state, down to minute details, without arguments for why these details need be that way. He certainly makes arguments, especially for larger points, but he does not for the details, which make up the majority of the work and are almost wholly irrelevant to anyone outside his time period and region.

My recommendation for new readers is to read the Definitions and the famous works of Plato. I’d also recommend Xenophon’s Memoirs of Socrates and Apology of Socrates. The rest may be put aside if you don’t have a particular interest in learning about minutiae of Plato’s ideas. If you’re expecting further elaboration on some of Plato’s more complex ideas by reading his lesser-known works, you won’t find much of value there. If you want more than just his famous works, I’d recommend reading all of Tetralogies I, III, and VIII. I did like Xenophon quite a lot; I think he’s underrated and given the short end of the stick since readers compare his work (including his Symposium, which has been taken too seriously by critics rather than read as a satire, which should be obvious) to the best of Plato, rather than Plato as a whole, which has much chaff mixed with wheat. Aristophanes was not all that useful. His portrayal of Socrates is similar to how Donald Trump might be portrayed by Trevor Noah; perhaps some aspects of truth are there, but it’s an obvious caricature for comedic effect.

Would I do it again?

No, and I don’t recommend you do it either. Read the Bible or church fathers or Luther or Melanchthon’s Orations (if you really desire to spend your time on philosophy)…. Really, just pick up your Bible and read that instead.

A common argument raised against Protestantism is that Scripture is somehow dependent on the Church, and thus, the Church must be causally prior to Scripture, so the authority of Scripture is derived from the authority of the Church, making the Church infallible, which is a violation of the principle of sola scriptura. This argument can take various forms. Gerhard handles 5 variations on this argument in his Locus On Scripture. The most common variety of this argument is that the canon of the Bible (IE which books belong in the Bible) is only known to us through the Church, so without the Church confirming the books, we cannot know what books belong and do not belong.

The most common argument may be formally presented:

Premise (P)1.1) Scripture is later than the Church with respect to the acceptance of those books with regard to us. Before the Scriptures were published, the Church was already then in existence.

P1.2) The Church accepted the sacred books, approved them, and commended them to posterity.

Conclusion (C)1) The authority of Scripture depends on the Church.

Refutation (based on Gerhard):

This is a confusion of the material and form of scripture. Those who received the sacred books from Moses, the prophets, evangelists, and apostles and who commended those books to posterity with their testimony were indeed previously in the assembly of the Church. Also, up to that time, the Church, considered formally, was earlier than Scripture as regards the work of writing. But those witnesses of Scripture were converted and became sons of the Church through the Word that Scripture contains. Therefore they were not earlier than Scripture, considered materially, that is, than the Word that is set forth in Scripture. God’s Word is that “incorruptible seed” through which human beings are reborn and become sons of God (James 1:18; 1 Pet. 1:23). The prophets and the apostles preached the same Word previously and later consigned it to writing. Therefore as incongruent as it is to claim that fruit comes before the seed, so absurd is it also to claim that the Church absolutely and simply precedes Scripture, considered materially and with respect to the Word that it contains.

But I’d like to present an entirely different approach to this question from natural theology, with a particularly Lutheran flair. This argument is built from the ground up, making as few theological assumptions as possible, and instead arguing from philosophical grounds.

The argument formally presented:

P2.1) The most metaphysically robust and airtight theosophical system should be accepted as the only true theosophical system.

P2.2) A belief in a classical, triune, incarnate God is the most metaphysically robust and airtight theosophical system.

P2.3) Only Christianity satisfies P2.2.

C2.1) Only Christianity should be accepted as the only true theosophical system.

P2.4) If only Christianity should be accepted as the only true theosophical system, then only a finite number of possible canonical lists are possibly true.

C2.2) Only a finite number of possible canonical lists are possibly true.

Allow me to elaborate on this argument, since it will not be abundantly clear to the reader without context.

P2.1 relies the principal that a system that is the most internally harmonious, plausible, and explanatory powerful should be accepted as true. The alternative option to this is to deny that internal harmony, plausibility, and explanatory power are virtues of a good system– whatever that system may be, which I’m rejecting as foolish prima facie. In this case, we’re looking at a system of combined theology and philosophy (theosophical was an older term for this, though it has taken on new meanings that I do not wish to import here).

P2.2 has three primary components

The first component is that classical theism (CT) is true. I have no need to demonstrate this here, nor could I do so in few words. CT has a good video defending the existence of the God of CT and a good video elaborating on Divine Simplicity. Mathoma has a series of videos on this subject. Aquinas both defends and defines CT in part 1 of his Summa. What’s important here is that CT can be defended entirely from philosophical grounds, and is accepted even by other religions. Confessional Protestants and Roman Catholics generally agree that CT is true, so on those fronts, this should not be controversial. The case for CT in Eastern Christianity and non-confessional Protestantism is hazy. In the East, the Energy-Essence Distinction (EED) can take a variety of possible interpretations, some of which may violate what is traditionally called “classical theism.” The non-confessional Protestant traditions that reject CT include theistic personalism (TP) and theistic mutualism (TM); the former are common in evangelicalism and the latter in Dutch Reformed and Reformed Baptist circles. I’ll address TM immediately; the others may be explained later. TM is part of Presuppositionalism, which is a theosophical system that rejects natural theology, or at least rejects that we can reason about God with human logic. Those who believe in TM will reject this entire argument from the outset for this reason. I’m assuming TM is false prima facie in this argument, without further elaboration. For a good treatment of this subject, see Without Excuse. But even if TM were true, it would not hurt the argument. The existence of the EED and TP positions in the East and non-confessional Protestant traditions does not weaken the argument, as I will explain later.

The second component is the necessity for a triune God. This is demonstrated best by Vecchio and Journeaux. They put forward 5 philosophical arguments for the Trinity, based on the presupposition that CT is true. The first 4 arguments are simply arguments for a multi-personal God, but the fifth argument is specifically for a triune God– a single God in three persons. The argument is presented formally:

P3.1) God is maximally elegant.

P3.2) If God is more than one person, then God is a) two, b) three, c) four or finitely more than four, or d) infinitely many persons.

P3.3) God is more than one person (from proofs 1-4).

P3.4) If God is two persons, God is not maximally elegant (by lack of perfect condilection).

C3.1) Therefore, God is not two persons (from P1 and P4, by modus tollens).

P3.5) If God is four or more than four persons then God is not maximally elegant.

C3.2) Therefore, God is three persons.

P3.1 and P3.3 need to be explained. P3.1 is an assumption of CT, but it is also fitting in the EED and TP systems, though perhaps slightly augmented– not in a way, however, that impedes the argument. P3.4 is probably baffling to the modern reader, but in a classical theosophical system, it is clearer. This premise is derived from Richard of St Victor, the medieval theologian. Paul Burgess has a good article on this subject. If the reader would like a full treatment, check out Richard of St Victor’s On the Trinity. The rough idea is this: Maximal elegance is only achieved with perfect virtues, which includes love. Love (dilectio) is only perfected when it is shared (condilectio). Sharing love requires 3 or more persons. So God is 3 or more persons. Shared love can be understood by example: Have you ever loved something, but had nobody to tell, and this made your love for the thing feel incomplete? That is the lack of condilection (shared love). In a marriage, there are two spouses, but would a wedding with only the spouses really be complete? Or is this love best fulfilled by the shared presence of the minister to officiate and the witnesses to sign the license? This too is an expression of condilection. P3.5 is roughly based on Ockham’s Razor– The explanation that requires the fewest metaphysical commitments is most elegant, all else equal. God being more than 3 persons doesn’t make God any more perfect, since it adds no new virtue nor does it complete any incomplete virtues, so it is an unnecessary commitment for God to be more than 3 persons, so He is most elegant as 3 persons.

The third component of this argument is the necessity of an incarnate God. This argument can be made in a number of ways. Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo puts forth an argument along these lines. The Franciscan theologians have been known for making arguments for the absolute primacy of Christ, which also leads to an argument along these lines. A very good argument was presented for this by Classical Theist. The argument is presented formally:

P4.1) God is the essence of goodness.

P4.2) Goodness naturally diffuses.

C4.1) God naturally diffuses.

P4.3) God is maximally elegant.

P4.4) If God diffused Himself into creation by more than 1 means, this would be less elegant than by 1 means, all else equal.

C4.2) If God diffused Himself into creation, He did so by 1 means, all else equal.

P4.5) If God diffused Himself into all creation, this would be more natural of goodness than to diffuse into only some of creation.

P4.6) To be the essence of goodness is to be maximally good.

P4.7) There is a distinction between creation and Creator.

C4.3) God diffuses Himself into all creation while remaining distinguished from creation.

P4.8) Man is a microcosm of the whole of creation, being an intellectual, sentient, vegetative, and mineral creature in one substance.

P4.9) Diffusion into a microcosm of a macrocosm is a most fitting manner by which one might diffuse wholly into the macrocosm without becoming the macrocosm itself.

C4.4) God diffuses Himself into creation by becoming man.

P4.1 is an assumption of CT. P4.2 is a feature of classical philosophy. It is seen in many examples: Good teachers naturally lead to good students. Good trees spawns good saplings. Good music naturally inspires new good music. Etc. P4.3 is an assumption of CT. P4.4 comes back to Ockham’s Razor again. P4.5 is simply explained in the following: A maximally good teacher will lead all his students to be good, not just some. A maximally good tree spawns all good saplings, not just some. Maximally good music inspired all new good music, not just some new good music and some new bad music. P4.6 is self-evident in the CT system. P4.7 is an assumption of CT. P4.8 is part of many classical religions but is also seen in Aristotle and Porphyry. It is an assumption of classical philosophy, generally speaking. P4.9 is assumed. Thus C4.4 follows, demonstrating the fittingness of the incarnation. This argument too can be made from the perspective of the EED or TP, again with augmentation, without hurting the argument.

P2.3 states that only Christianity allows for the features of P2.2. No other world religion satisfies the requirements. Again, the EED and TP do not hurt P2.3. The EED is unique to Christianity, so holding to that position, does not allow for other religions. The same is true for TM. TP allows for exceptions; however, if the reader is convinced of TP, along with the arguments for a triune, incarnate God, this bars other religions. It is true that somebody could construct a some new religion that satisfies P2.2, but following this new religion seems foolish on the grounds that Christianity has had innumerable highly-intelligent followers, it remains the largest world religion (for what that’s worth in terms of plausibility), and it has stood the test of time and place, which is not something that can be said for many religions. It’s true that other religions are sizeable, long standing, and far-reaching, but none of them satisfy P2.2, nor do they rank at the largest religion.

Thus, We reach C2.1, that Christianity is true, so if Christianity is true, the question of “What are the scriptures?” arises and is answered in P2.4.

P2.4 states that this question has a very narrow set of answers, especially in context of the definition of this religion from P2.2. P2.2 necessarily rules out various heretical Christian-esque groups, including Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, non-Trinitarians (Unitarians, Oneness Pentecostals, Arians, Pneumatomachi, Sabellians, Adoptionists, Gnostic sects, Manichaeism), and various modern fringe sects, who are often Open Theists. If the reader accepts TP, this does broaden the options to a degree, allowing for some more fringe groups (Quakers, for example), but we are assuming that CT is true (again, see the arguments of Classical Theist, Mathoma, and Aquinas above), not TP. So in reality, we have a narrowed set of Christianity that includes the traditional branches– Roman Catholics, Eastern Christianity, Confessional Protestants, and some of the later more orthodox Protestant groups (Methodists for example). If one (or more?) of these groups is true, then there is a set number of possibly true answers to the question “What are the scriptures?” This is the conclusion C2.2.

This set of possibilities includes a canon as small as the traditional Protestant 39 book Old Testament (perhaps without Esther, which may be considered antilegomena by some) + the traditional homologoumena of the New Testament (the traditional New Testament, save for Hebrews, James, Jude, 2 Peter, 2-3 John, and Revelation) or as big as the 39 book Old Testament + just under 20 deuterocanonical books (and additions to books) + the traditional 27 book New Testament.

What’s important is that we’ve reached the conclusion that we have at least 38 books of the Old Testament and 20 books of the New Testament, without making any theological commitments about how we got these books, why they need to be accepted, what authority is had by the church or tradition, or which other books should be added to the list. We simply know that because at least one of these groups is correct, we must accept at least these 58 books (and no more than the maximum size mentioned).

Lutheranism does not have a set canon for the Bible, but that doesn’t mean there are no limits to allowable positions. Our confessions cite various Biblical books as scriptural; our liturgies use certain books as scripture for the readings, propers, and ordinaries; and we have the famous Luther Bibel of course. But because of this leeway, we are not dogmatically tied to proving a specific canon. This is important to this argument as Lutherans do not need to dogmatically prove any particular list of scriptures apart from at least the 58 books mentioned earlier, as we allow of variance on canonical acceptance (and no more than the maximum size mentioned). Lutheranism represents the group that requires the fewest commitments on this matter and also allows for the widest variance making this argument uniquely fitting.